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Business increasingly competes in a global marketplace. Though borders of
nations once largely contained commerce, now all types of transactions occur
across those borders. Aided by an increased consumer demand for foreign goods,'
by the deflation of grand-scale ideological division and isolationism that divided
the world during the Cold War, and by the proliferation of sophisticated communi-
cation technologies, countries have brought their cultures and businesses into
close contact. Marked expansion of transnational trade in goods and services has
followed the increasing familiarity and, in turn, interdependence of countries.
Now, however, businesses venture beyond their nations' boundaries to fulfill a
variety of demands, not just to find new markets. They seek, for example, more
efficient production facilities, different technologies, ideas for products, partners
for joint ventures, and expertise in specialized fields. 2 Businesses are thus becom-
ing more international and less easily identifiable by nationality. 3
This new international economic activity affects antitrust enforcement.
Whereas enforcement of competition laws4 once occurred within a single country
where both the conduct and most of its effects could be found, the acts and
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1. See David J. Gerber, Symposium on Antitrust Law and the Internationalization of Markets,
Foreword: Antitrust and the Challenge of Internationalization, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689, 691-92
(1988).
2. See id. at 689.
3. See ROBERT S. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST-CENTURY
CAPITALISM 113 (1991).
4. The terms "competition" and "antitrust" are used interchangeably throughout this paper,
though in some contexts they may imply different subject matters.
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consequences of today's commerce may be spread across many different nations.
Consequently, domestic antitrust offices will want to prosecute conduct that oc-
curs abroad because it affects domestic markets. According to Anne Bingaman,
Chief of the Antitrust Division at the U.S. Department of Justice, international
antitrust issues are "at the forefront" of the Department's agenda.5 A new interna-
tional focus by antitrust offices will also mean that certain international conduct
that affects many markets will be the focus of antitrust investigations by more
than one country.
These new types of enforcement situations create dilemmas for governments,
their competition agencies, and the private sector. The Antitrust Division and
its counterparts in other countries, though they may want to pursue foreign compa-
nies, know that obtaining evidence with which to prosecute is procedurally chal-
lenging and diplomatically risky. They can certainly gather information about
domestic companies, but that is, at best, only part of the evidence they need.
Without enough evidence, they cannot prove their cases.6 Companies, for their
part, are often frustrated by multiple and conflicting requirements that several
countries' investigations impose on them.
An obvious path to addressing these difficulties is to increase cooperation
among the competition offices of different nations. Establishing a direct channel
through which critical information about companies can flow would help the
competition agencies' investigative efforts as well as facilitate the coordination
of their enforcement activities. Several countries, as well as the European Union
(EU), have antitrust cooperation agreements. 7 Some of these agreements, which
establish nonbinding mechanisms allowing different countries' antitrust offices
to share information, have enjoyed moderate success in encouraging countries
to communicate. 8
None of the civil antitrust arrangements, however, allow the sharing of the
information often most helpful to international antitrust enforcement and coopera-
tion: information classified as confidential. The information that countries protect
through confidentiality laws-internal documents, information received from
companies, investigatory findings-is the most valuable for enforcement actions,
and the hardest to obtain. As one antitrust official lamented, a "wall of silence"
around each antitrust agency prevents them from communicating in a meaningful
5. Anne Bingaman, Address at Stanford Law School Sponsored by the Law and Business Society
(Feb. 8, 1994).
6. See infra text accompanying note 13.
7. For example, see infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text. For the purposes of this paper,
and in light of the recent change in nomenclature, the EC Commission will retain its name, and the
European Community (EC) will be referred to as the EU, or European Union.
8. For one example, see the discussion of the U.S.-EU agreement infra note 136 and accompa-
nying text.
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way. 9 In addition, none of the civil antitrust arrangements allow one authority
to collect information on another's behalf using their compulsory powers.
To address this growing problem, the United States and the rest of the interna-
tional community must act soon. They should draft bilateral and eventually a
multilateral agreement that would allow them to cooperate with one another.
Most importantly, the final agreements, whether modifications of existing ar-
rangements or new efforts, must provide for reciprocal access to nonpublic files.
The agreements should also encourage antitrust offices to use their compulsory
powers of evidence gathering on one another's behalf. Without these new
agreements, existing competition offices will not remain effective enforcers of
antitrust law.
A new U.S. law, the International Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1994,1° repre-
sents an important first step in the direction of better cooperation. The Act allows
the Antitrust Division to enter into international cooperation agreements with its
sister agencies. 1 Other countries should follow suit in passing such legislation
so the process of drafting and negotiating new cooperation agreements can begin
quickly.
This article analyzes the problem of cooperation in the international antitrust
field and suggests a specific approach for addressing it. Part I identifies the need
for better confidential information-sharing arrangements and other substantial
cooperation among the competition offices of different countries. Part I highlights
some of the obstacles to antitrust information sharing in general, and to confiden-
tial information sharing in particular. Part III is a review of the current arrange-
ments that countries use to gather antitrust evidence, both in general and in the
competition area. Part IV outlines progressive arrangements in other enforcement
areas (for example, securities) that may serve as models for an antitrust arrange-
ment. Finally, Part V draws on the preceding analysis to propose several principles
that could provide guidance for new agreements that promote better cooperation
in the field of antitrust enforcement.
I. The Importance of Cooperation in International Antitrust
Enforcement
As competition is internationalized, domestic antitrust offices will find it in-
creasingly difficult to regulate anticompetitive behavior without cooperation from
9. Panelists Probe Prospect of Harmonization of Antitrust, Review EC Merger Developments,
62 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 664, 668 (1992) [hereinafter Panelists Probe] (quoting former
Dep. Ass't Att'y Gen. Charles A. James).
10. The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-438.
11. Id.; see Jeremy Kahn, U.S. Acts to Boost Antitrust Efforts, FIN. TIMES, June 14, 1994, at 5;
Clinton Signs Bill to Help Enforcers Obtain Foreign-Located Antitrust Evidence, BNA, MANAGEMENT
BRIEFING, Nov. 3, 1994 [hereinafter Clinton Signs Bill]; Bingaman, supra note 5.
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their counterparts abroad.' 2 "[T]he heart of any American antitrust case is the
discovery of business documents," and current laws make these documents very
difficult to obtain.' 3 Bingaman states: "[T]he most significant obstacle to our
international enforcement efforts has been our limited ability to get information
and documents from outside the U.S. in order to build a case that will stand up in
court. 14 To demonstrate the parameters of the problem, she offers a hypothetical
example involving an international price-fixing cartel in a highly concentrated,
large industry whose members are located in the United States and another coun-
try, and whose conduct is directed at both markets.' 5 Both countries have laws
that prohibit such collusion, and both competition offices are interested in investi-
gating and prosecuting the conduct. ' 6 The heart of the governments' cases will
be evidence that shows the existence of price-fixing. This information could
include a memorandum of a phone call made to a competitor, a calendar entry
of a meeting of competitors with no obviously legitimate purpose, or a copy of
a competitor's price list.'
7
The authorities logically start by collecting information about the company
located within their own country using the compulsory powers allocated to them
under domestic law. They will likely have to classify the information they collect
as confidential. 8 Once both offices have the information they need from the
domestic manufacturer, they are faced with trying to procure information from
the company that is located abroad. Domestic discovery methods will prove
fruitless. Further, competition authorities will not be able to cooperate with for-
eign sister enforcement agencies to resolve their discovery quandry, because they
lack agreements that overcome the confidentiality problem.
Bingaman explains the frustrating situation: The Antitrust Division has no
authority to subpoena documents for the foreign enforcement officials, share
documents with them, or even disclose what documents it has.' 9 The two competi-
tion offices each have only part of the information they need to prosecute the
12. See Gerber, supra note 1, at 700.
13. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (N.D. Ill 1979).
14. Clinton Signs Bill, supra note 11.
15. Bingaman, supra note 5. This hypothetical is the most simple case because it involves only
two countries. The same scenario would apply if the cartel were spread across many countries and
engaged in price fixing in several countries. Ironically, confidentiality laws prevented some officials
in antitrust authorities from giving more specific examples of instances when they would have wanted
an information-sharing agreement.
16. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ANTI-
TRUST 31 (1991) [hereinafter ABA] ("[T]he harmful effects of cartel conduct are increasingly likely
to impact international business").
17. Telephone Interview with Charles S. Stark, Chief of International Commerce Section of
Antitrust Division at U.S. Department of Justice (Mar. 4, 1994).
18. See text Part II.C.
19. See Bingaman, supra note 5; see also infra notes 62-74 and accompanying text; ABA, supra
note 16, at 8. The Canada/U.S. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) might be available in this
situation. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
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cartel. Each has information the other needs, and domestic confidentiality laws
bar both from sharing their most compelling information. To be sure, the public
information each has and could share under an exisiting arrangement could be
significant. But the information key to the prosecution, that is the documents
that demonstrate the existence of price-fixing, would be unreleasable.20 These
difficulties understandably discourage authorities from prosecuting international
antitrust cases.
The problems described above are not hypothetical or harmless. The case
Bingaman describes mirrors a U.S. enforcement effort that has recently resulted
in grand jury indictments. For two years, the Department of Justice has been
investigating an alleged conspiracy to fix prices of industrial diamonds in world
markets. The parties involved, General Electric Company and a unit of the De-
Beers group, now control 80 percent of the market.22 The investigation has been
hampered by difficulties in getting information from Europe that might show
that mid-level managers in Belgium and Germany discussed prices in 1991 and
1992.23 This conspiracy potentially allows substantial illicit gains by the two
companies involved. Yet the antitrust agreement between the United States and
Germany is inadequate to help the countries tackle it.
2 4
Ideally, increased information sharing in individual cases could pave the way
for substantive cooperation in the international community, which, in turn, could
aid antitrust enforcement. As countries communicate about cases, procedures,
and laws, they will learn more about each other's enforcement regimes, and
will develop relationships that could lead to better coordination. Currently, an
international merger or joint venture can be subject to enforcement by many
countries applying disparate policies .2  An extreme example is the Gillette-
Wilkinson leveraged buy-out and acquisition, which fourteen different countries'
antitrust authorities investigated to some degree. 6 The coordination of these types
20. For a discussion of domestic confidentiality laws, see infra notes 66-74 and accompanying
text.
21. See Owen P. Martikan, The Boundaries of the Hague Evidence Convention: Lower Court
Interest Balancing After the Aerospatiale Decision, 68 TEx. L. REV. 1003, 1029 (1990).
22. Keith Bradsher, U.S. Indicts G.E. and De Beers in Diamond Pricing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 1994, at DI.
23. William M. Carley & Amal Kumar Naj, Price-Fixing Charges Put GE and De Beers Under
Tough Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1994, at A1. One way the Justice Department managed to
get information was to arrest a key official while he was traveling in the United States. Zachary
Schiller & Patrick Oster, For GE, a Time Bomb in Ohio?, Bus. WK., Feb. 14, 1994, at 30.
24. An example of the need for these arrangements is the Wood Pulp case, Case 85/202, In re
Wood Pulp Cartel, 1985 O.J. (L 85) 1, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 474. In that case, the EC Commission
prosecuted a cartel whose members were located in Canada, Finland, and the United States. DG-IV,
the EU antitrust directorate, would undoubtedly have benefited by an arrangement that allowed it
to solicit confidential information from competition agencies in those countries, or allowed those
countries to use their compulsory powers to gather information on behalf of the Commission.
25. See ABA, supra note 16, at 1.
26. See MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD: A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES
66-83 (1994); OECD Lacks Enthusiasm for Draft International Antitrust Code, BNA INT'L Bus. &
FIN. DAILY, Dec. 15, 1993.
SPRING 1995
122 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
of investigations might eventually lead to international convergence of substantive
antitrust regulations. Attempts to implement an international antitrust code are
premature, but may be successful in the future, especially in an atmosphere of
cooperation.27 Such a code could eventually lead to a unified system in which
antitrust offices could more easily control international anticompetitive conduct.
Not surprisingly, many studies have recognized the need for international
antitrust cooperation agreements. In 1984, an Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD) publication noted that "[i]t is . . .vitally im-
portant that adequate procedures exist to enable competition authorities to obtain
sufficient information to evaluate the effects or legality of commercial activi-
ties." 28 The publication further recommended that:
[OECD] Member countries should supply each other with such relevant information
on restrictive business practices as their significant national interests permit them to
disclose. Where confidentiality considerations constrain such cooperation, Member
countries should consider such measures as may be necessary and appropriate to enable
them to supply information or reply to requests from foreign competition authorities,
provided that adequate assurances to preserve the confidentiality of the information are
received from those authorities.29
In 1991, the American Bar Association's Special Committee on International
Antitrust observed that current information exchanges among antitrust enforce-
ment agencies "are at present restricted to non-confidential information [which]
greatly limits the potential utility of these exchanges, since much of the truly
pertinent information will have been received in confidence from the parties
themselves or third parties. '0 The Committee proposed that countries amend
their national confidentiality laws to allow agencies to share information submitted
to them for purposes of an investigation.3 In a 1993 report to the OECD, Profes-
sors Richard A. Whish and Diane Wood32 recommended both greater general
cooperation in the process of merger review, and consideration of a system in
which parties could choose to waive their confidentiality rights to permit coopera-
tion between agencies.33 They also noted the advantages of competition authorities
27. See OECD Lacks Enthusiasm for Draft International Antitrust Code, supra note 26; Interna-
tional Antitrust Code Will Be Studied by GAT Members, 65 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 259,
259 (1993); Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Trade and the Twenty First Century-Rounding the Circle,
The Handler Lecture, Address Before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (May
26, 1993).
28. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION LAW EN-
FORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION 73 (1984) [herein-
after COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT].
29. Id. at 75.
30. ABA, supra note 16, at 190.
31. See id.
32. Diane Wood is now the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for International Antitrust at the
U.S. Department of Justice.
33. See MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD, supra note 26, at 103-05. Parties might agree to
waive their confidentiality rights if they believed that a consolidated merger review process would
mean cost savings.
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collecting information for one another.M Many other professionals in the antitrust
field have also called for increased cooperation and consultation.3"
II. Obstacles to a Strong Information-Sharing Agreement
Although countries generally agree on the need for better cooperation, their
laws, habits, and fears pose barriers to implementation. Countries have achieved
considerable progress regarding cooperation agreements, but to make further
strides they must continue to address certain obstacles. These potential barriers-
differing antitrust policies, concerns over national economic interests, and na-
tional confidentiality laws-must be anticipated to move towards a better coopera-
tion regime.
A. DIFFERING APPROACHES TO ANTITRUST
Competition laws evolved independently in different countries to suit different
needs. Stated and unstated objectives for competition policy, therefore, vary
significantly among nations.36 These differing objectives can pose barriers to
antitrust cooperation, especially in the sharing of sensitive material. When an
antitrust office that is solicited for information does not agree with the goal of
the other country's investigation, that office may be unenthusiastic about cooperat-
ing. "It is axiomatic that in anti-trust matters the policy of one state may be to
defend what it is the policy of another state to attack." 37
The controversy surrounding the U.S. extraterritorial application of its antitrust
laws illustrates the difficulties that can arise from conflicting approaches to anti-
trust. 38 U.S. law sometimes permits the prosecution of antitrust misconduct that
34. Id. at 98.
35. See, e.g., ABA, supra note 16, at 191; Gerber, supra note 1, at 703-04 ("Increasing interna-
tionalization of competition combined with jurisdictional limits on the capacities of individual states
to achieve their regulatory goals by themselves means that the U.S. will become increasingly dependent
on foreign cooperation to accomplish its economic regulatory objectives.").
36. See generally Joseph P. Griffin, EC/U. S. Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: Impact on Trans-
national Business, L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus., June 22, 1993, at 51; Fox, supra note 27, at 14-29
(discussing EU competition law and comparing it to that of the United States); W.S. COMANOR ET
AL., COMPETITION POLICY IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: ECONOMIC IssuEs AND INSTITUTIONS
(1990) (nationals from major industrialized countries describing their different antitrust policies);
Erika Nijenhuis, Comment, Antitrust Suits Involving Foreign Commerce: Suggestions for Procedural
Reform, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1005 & nn. 13-14 (1987) (noting that developing nations approach
antitrust from a different perspective); Thomas W. Dunfee & Aryeh S. Friedman, The Extra-
Territorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws: A Proposal for an Interim Solution, 45 OHIO
ST. L.J. 883, 891 & nn.49-50 (1984) (explaining that Western and Islamic countries have different
perspectives).
37. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 App. Cas. 547, 617 (H.L. 1977).
38. The issue of extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws is complex and controversial.
See, e.g., GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 590-617 (2d ed. 1992); ERIK NEREP, EXTRATERRITORIAL CONTROL OF COMPETITION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983); CECIL J. OLMSTEAD, EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND
RESPONSES THERETO (1984); Warren Pengilley, Extraterritorial Effects of United States Commercial
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harms U.S. consumers, even when the acts in question have taken place abroad.39
Other countries, including the United Kingdom, have perceived such wide juris-
diction to be an infringement of their sovereignty. After the Rio Tinto Zinc litiga-
tion, for example, which involved the U.S. Department of Justice supporting
extraterritorial discovery requests regarding a uranium cartel, 4° Britain adopted
the 1980 Protection of Trading Interests Act, which allows nationals to resist
complying with certain discovery orders of foreign authorities.41 This Act also
permits British courts to refuse to enforce foreign judgments that "infringe[] the
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom." 42
Another example of the different national views of antitrust involves the varying
opinions regarding the Japanese treatment of their keiretsu (a term that refers to
close business alliances). The U.S. government and commentators have accused
Japan of being excessively tolerant to arrangements that deprive outside compa-
nies of economic opportunity; the Japanese government disagrees with that assess-
ment, and permits such associations.43 Because of their differing views, Japanese
and American antitrust agencies will likely be unwilling to help each other prose-
cute some types of conduct.
Countries have cooperated despite these differences. As illustrated in Part III,
antitrust offices have exchanged nonconfidential information even when they
have ideological disagreements. One way future bilateral agreements could mini-
mize this problem is by making cooperation explicitly not contingent upon the
assisting country's evaluation of the merits of the requesting county's investiga-
tion. 44
and Antitrust Legislation: A View from "Down Under, " 16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 833 (1983);
P.C.F. Pettit & C.J.O. Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial Application of
United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 697 (1982); Peter N. Swan, International Antitrust:
The Reach and Efficacy of United States Law, 63 OR. L. REv. 177 (1984); John H. Shenefield,
Thoughts on Extraterritorial Application of the United States Antitrust Laws, 52 FORDHAM L. REV.
350 (1983); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Antitrust, Interest Analysis, and the New Conflict of Laws, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1976 (1982) (book review); Eleanor M. Fox, Extraterritoriality, Antitrust, and the
New Restatement: Is "Reasonableness" the Answer?, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 565, 577
(1987); J.S. Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States: A
View from Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195 (1978).
39. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 38, at 590; Justice and FTC Issue Draft Guidelines on
International Antitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 488 (1994).
40. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 App. Cas. 547 (H.L. 1977).
41. Protection of Trading Interests Act (PTIA) 1980, ch. 11, § 2 (Eng.); see BORN & WESTIN,
supra note 38, at 603 & n.89; RICHARD P. WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 386 (3d ed. 1993).
42. See PTIA, supra note 41, § 4.
43. See Seminar Examines Operation and Impact of Keiretsu System, 61 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. 616, 617 (1991); Robert L. Cuts, Capitalism in Japan: Cartels and Keiretsu, HARV.
Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1992, at 48. Japan and the United States have undertaken a series of negotiations
known as the Structural Impediments Initiative which has addressed the issue of Japanese antitrust
enforcement. See ABA, supra note 16, at 107; Fox, supra note 27, at 13.
44. For a sample provision, see text part V.E.
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B. CONCERN OVER NATIONAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS
Another obstacle to smooth cooperation between antitrust offices is the specter
of damage to national industry. Antitrust enforcement often implicates significant
economic interests. When those interests work to the benefit of one country but
to the detriment of another, the latter country may not be willing to cooperate
in prosecuting an alleged wrongdoer. 45 The reluctance to share information may
come from a fear of aiding competitors in other countries or of harming one's
own industry. For example, without significant assurances of confidentiality, an
antitrust office may be hesitant to reveal competitively sensitive information (such
as the kind obtained in a merger investigation about a company's future plans)
to a competition office in the country where the chief rival of that company is
headquartered.
Likewise, when foreign prosecution directly threatens the financial health of
an important domestic company industry, a competition office may not want to
aid in that prosecution. Some countries' blocking statutes, which prohibit the
release of sensitive information to other countries, make this form of noncoopera-
tion explicit.6 This phenomenon may be even more prevalent in an international-
ized marketplace where countries seek to bolster the competitiveness of their
domestic firms in the face of international competition. 47 One well-known inci-
dent, the Laker affair, may have involved such concernss.4 The case involved
Laker Airways, which filed a $1.7 billion antitrust action in U.S. district court,
alleging a price-fixing conspiracy. The British airlines named as defendants,
including British Airways, obtained an injunction from a lower British court,
which prevented Laker from pursuing the suit in U.S. court, based on the claim
that the U.S. court was infringing the sovereignty of the United Kingdom by
asserting jurisdiction.49 The House of Lords, however, overturned the lower
court's decision, paving the way for the suit, and acknowledging U.S. jurisdiction.
The British government under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was dismayed
at this outcome: "The Government reacted with understandable consternation
[at the House of Lord's ruling]. For Whitehall's lawyers were only too aware
45. See, e.g., Panelists Probe, supra note 9, at 668 (comments of former Dep. Ass't Att'y Gen.
Charles A. James regarding self-interest of nations).
46. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text; see, e.g., French Act of July 16, 1980, on
Communication to Foreign Persons of Documents and Information Relating to Economic, Commercial
or Technical Matters, No. 80-538, J.O., 17 Juillet 1980, at 1799 (limiting transmission of information
related to "essential economic interests" of France).
47. The very conduct that concerns foreign governments-the cartelization of domestic firms,
for example-may be exactly what a domestic authority would be reluctant to prosecute when that
arrangement could make domestic firms more viable in an internationally competitive marketplace.
See Gerber, supra note 1, at 693.
48. For a thorough account of the facts, see Daryl A. Libow, The Laker Antitrust Litigation:
The Jurisdictional "Rule of Reason" Applied to Transnational Injunctive Relief, 71 CORNELL L.
REv. 645, 655-6 (1986); ABA, supra note 16, at 151-52.
49. See ABA, supra note 16, at 151.
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that trial by jury in the civil action posed an inevitable risk for [British Airways]
and its privatisation plan."' 0 One explanation for the British government's reac-
tion is that it feared the impact of treble-damage liability on the financial security
of British Airways. The government then owned the airline but had scheduled
it for privatization as the "flagship" of the Thatcher privatization scheme. 5 In
the end, the British government not only refused to support an enforcement effort
but lobbied against the prosecution of British defendants. In the face of heavy
diplomatic pressure from the British government,52 the Reagan administration
eventually called off the U.S. grand jury investigation.53
Governments may also want to protect their export cartels from prosecution
by foreign antitrust authorities. Many countries do not prosecute cartels that only
export goods to other countries, or pure export cartels. 4 For example, France
excludes pure export cartels from prohibition under French competition law.55
Japan allows export cartels if the government is first notified under the Export
and Import Transactions Law. 56 If the cartel in question does not harm competition
in the country where it is located, but does contribute significantly to GNP, the
home country may be unwilling to aid a foreign country that wants to prosecute the
cartel. For example, an agreement that would have allowed the EC Commission in
the wood pulp case57 to receive information that other competition offices had
50. DUNCAN CAMPBELL-SMITH, STRUGGLE FOR TAKE-OFF: THE BRITISH AIRWAYS STORY 172
(1986).
51. See id. at 3; see also Annika Doos, Cheap Flight Champion Ends Legal Fight, Paves Way
for BA Sale, REUTERS N. EUR. SERVICE, Aug. 22, 1985.
52. See CAMPBELL-SMITH, supra note 50, at 173, 195.
53. See Carole A. Shifrin, Laker Airways Antitrust Suit Nears Settlement for $48 Million, AVIA-
TION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 22, 1985, at 27; ABA, supra note 16, at 152.
54. See ABA, supra note 16, at 40.
55. French law prohibiting alliances and other concerted action is found in article 7 of the primary
competition law. See Article 7 of Ordonnance no. 86-1243 du Ier d6cembre 1986 relative A la libertd
des prix et de la concurrence (Modifi6 par loi no. 87-499 du 6 juillet 1987) [hereinafter Ordonnance
no. 86-1243] in MINISTRE DE L'ECONOMIE DES FINANCES ET DU BUDGET, CONCURRENCE, CONSOMMA-
TION, FRAUDES 59 (1991) (Ordinance No. 86-1243 of December 1, 1986, Relating to Freedom of
Prices and Competition (Fr.), reprintedinJ. WILLIAM ROWLEY &DONALD I. BAKER, INTERNATIONAL
MERGERS: THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 333 (1991)). But article 62 of the Price Ordinance No. 45-1483,
issued on June 30, 1945, specifies that "exports abroad direct or through an agent" are not disallowed,
and are thus exempted from article 7. B3 WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION § 2.06[2], at FRA 2-36
(Julian 0. von Kalinowski ed., 1987); see ABA, supra note 16, at 43 n. 13. Other countries have
similar provisions allowing export cartels. See id. at 40-73.
56. See Yushutsunyu torihiki ho [Export and Import Transactions Law], Law No. 299 of 1952,
as amended 1965, translated in JAPAN FOREIGN TRADE NEWS 348-73 (spec. ed. 1974). The United
States, under the Webb-Pomerane Act, also excepts associations engaged solely in export trade from
prosecution under the Sherman Act. See ABA, supra note 16, at 49-61; 15 U.S.C. §§ 62, 63 (1988).
Germany's laws retain slightly more control over the cartels. See Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschran-
kungen [Act Against Restraints of Competition], amended by Viertes Gesetz zur Anderung des
Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen [Fourth Act to Amend the Act Against Restraints of
Competition], 1980 BGBI.I, 458 (F.R.G.). For a discussion of German law, see ABA, supra note
16, at 70-73.
57. See In re Wood Pulp Cartel, supra note 11.
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collected, or perhaps better, asking them to use their compulsory powers to collect
certain information, would have been very helpful to DG-IV, the EU antitrust
directorate. But those countries may have had incentives to protect their domestic
industry.
It is unclear how often these types of significant differences would arise in
the course of ongoing cooperation among antitrust agencies. Perhaps countries
will eventually agree to help one another except in unusual cases, in return for
reliable reciprocal assistance. Any future agreements, however, will have to
allow for this progression and will have to give countries a way to refuse to
cooperate in extreme situations.58
C. NATIONAL CONFIDENTIALITY LAWS
Clearly current information-sharing agreements have occasionally been able
to avoid the above outlined philosophical and economic obstacles because coun-
tries have exchanged public information in an effort to cooperate. These obsta-
cles will continue to diminish in importance as authorities discover that the im-
portant contest pits them against increasingly powerful multinational companies,
not against each other. The most concrete obstacle to the sharing of antitrust
information is that of national confidentiality laws. These laws still prevent the
exchange of much vital information and remain a barrier that future efforts toward
antitrust cooperation must address.
Most industrialized countries protect information gathered during the course
of an antitrust investigation or volunteered by companies under a notification
process. 6° Countries take these precautions for a variety of important reasons:
to keep from tarnishing a company's reputation simply because it is being investi-
gated; to avoid affecting securities markets on the eve of restructurings; to pre-
serve incentives of companies to volunteer information; to prevent harassment
of witnesses; and most importantly, to protect companies' sensitive financial and
strategic information. 61 For antitrust offices to be effective in calling for the
amendment of confidentiality laws, as the U.S. Department of Justice has done,
they will have to address the important reasons for which the laws were first
passed.
An examination of the U.S. and EU confidentiality laws regarding antitrust
information reveals the types of systems in place that fufill the goal of confidential-
ity while preventing information sharing. In the United States the two bodies
responsible for antitrust enforcement, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and
58. See text at part V.C. for the solution the bilateral model suggests.
59. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
60. See COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 28, at 54-59.
61. See id. at 55. Confidentiality concerns were one reason the new EU merger law took seventeen
years to enact. See Members Worry EC Revealing Too Much Data, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 19,
1991.
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the Department of Justice, are constrained by different sets of confidentiality
rules. Under the Clayton Act,62 the FTC Act,63 and the FTC Rules of Practice,
FTC employees cannot release essentially any information they receive during
the course of a law enforcement investigation, unless the submitter consents.
The only exception to this general rule is that, subject to certain safeguards,
the FTC may share information with other state and federal law-enforcement
agencies.65
The rules for the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice are more
complex. When a party voluntarily supplies information, the Division, in contrast
to the FTC, is not subject to a general statutory confidentiality requirement. 66
The Division may agree, however, upon the request of the supplying firm, to
restrict disclosure of the information.67 Information that the Division obtains
through use of its compulsory powers is protected by one of several provisions.
Materials that companies submit under the Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notifica-
68tion system are protected from both FTC and Antitrust Division disclosure.
Section 7A(h) of the Clayton Act exempts the material from Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) 69 inquiries, as well as from public disclosure of any kind, except
in the case of an administrative or judicial proceeding in which the FTC or
the Division is a party. Materials the Division obtains in response to a Civil
Investigation Demand (CID) are protected by section 4(c) of the Antitrust Civil
Process Act, 7' which limits the disclosure of CID information to judicial proceed-
ings, grand juries, and some federal agencies. 72 The materials that Division attor-
neys collect in the course of a criminal grand jury investigation are protected by
a very broad obligation of secrecy. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
mandate secrecy with respect to all "matters occurring before the grand jury." 73
One exception that can allow the release of information in a criminal case to a
62. See Clayton Act § 7A(h), 18 U.S.C. § 12 (1988).
63. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, §§ 21(b), 21(c), 2 1(f), 15 U.S.C.
§ 57(b)(1) (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 103-312, 108 Stat. 1691, 1983-94 (1994).
64. FTC Rule 4. 10(d); see Edward A. Tomlinson, Use of the Freedom of Information Act for
Discovery Purposes, 43 MD. L. REV. 119, 163-64 (1984).
65. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, supra note 63, § 21(b)(6); FTC
Rule 4.11 (c).
66. There are, however, general government-wide criminal law constraints regarding the revela-
tion of sensitive information obtained during the course of duty. See 5 U.S.C. § 522a(a)-(i) (1988);
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (Supp. IV 1992).
67. See JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 57 (1992).
68. See Clayton Act § 7A(h), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
69. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
71. Id. §§ 1311-1314.
72. Id. § 1313(c)(3).
73. FED. R. CiuM. P. 6(e)(2). For a detailed analysis of what types of information are releasable
under what circumstances, see U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, 1 ANTITRUST DIVISION GRAND JURY PRACTICE
MANUAL II/1/62 (1991).
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foreign government permits disclosure "when so directed by a court.'' 4 As
discussed later in connection with securities regulation, many of these laws can
be amended to allow antitrust officials to release information to foreign antitrust
authorities under special circumstances.
EU law also contains substantial obligations regarding secrecy of company
information. Regulation 17/62, article 20(2) specifies that " 'the Commission
• . . shall not disclose information acquired as a result of this Regulation and of
the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.' ,76 Article 19(3)
ensures that when the Commission publishes its decisions, the texts are sensitive
to the revelation of potential business secrets.77 The new merger regulation, EU
Council Regulation 4064/89, also contains confidentiality protections. Article
17 prevents "the Commission and the competent authorities of the Member States,
their officials and other servants" from disclosing any information obtained
through applying the Regulation.78 The scope of these provisions is determined
by ongoing case law. 79 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) held, for example,
that "business secrets" must never be divulged. 80 In addition, the Regulation
provides that the information may only be used in connection with the case at
hand.8 Many other countries, such as Canada, 82 France, 83 Germany, 4 and the
United Kingdom,85 also have significant confidentiality protection in their respec-
tive laws.86
74. FED. R. Cium. P. § 6(e)(3)(C)(i); see discussion of Canada-U.S. MLAT, infra notes 155-58
and accompanying text.
75. See text Part 1V.C.
76. Council Regulation 17/62, art. 20, 1959-1962 O.J. Spec. Ed. 87 [hereinafter Council Regula-
tion 17/62], reprinted in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMPETITION LAW IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 52 (1990).
77. Id. art. 19(3).
78. Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1990 on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, art. 17, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 14, 23 [hereinafter Council Regulation 4064/89].
79. Professors Whish and Wood also point out that EU confidentiality provisions are affected
by standards of the Member States. See MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD, supra note 26, at 88,
106.
80. Case 53/85, AKZO Chemise BV v. Commission, 1986 E.C.R. 1965, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R.
231, 232.
81. Regulation 4064/89, supra note 78.
82. See Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, §§ 10-12, 29 (1990) (Can.).
83. Section 23 of title III of the 1986 competition ordinance in the French code, for example,
allows the President of the Competition Council to refuse to produce evidence that may contain
business secrets. Ordonnance no. 86-1243, supra note 55. Disclosure by parties to the suit or by
antitrust authorities "is punishable by a fine and imprisonment under Article 378 of the Criminal
Code." See COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 28, at 56.
84. See COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 28, at 56.
85. U.K. law, declares that "no information with respect to any particular business which has
been obtained under or by virtue of the provisions ... of this Act" shall be disclosed as long as
the business exists, without consent. Fair Trading Act 1973, ch. 41, § 133 (Eng.).
86. Banking secrecy laws are another type of confidentiality law that may occasionally pose a
problem for antitrust enforcement. See COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 28, at 52.
Agreements in other enforcement areas, namely money laundering, have overcome these legal stric-
tures, as could antitrust arrangements. See infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text; Richard M.
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Industry will be especially vocal in its insistence that these comprehensive
confidentiality protections for the information it surrenders to the government
are not diluted.87 Understandably, business is worried that sensitive and often
very valuable information, like trade secrets or strategic plans, will fall into their
competitors' hands. Thus, even during the negotiations of the U.S.-EU bilateral
antitrust agreement, which does not permit the exchange of confidential informa-
tion, business attorneys expressed concerns about confidentiality. 8 Other enforce-
ment regimes, like securities regulation, however, have managed to satisfy these
strong concerns. One way an antitrust agreement could be similarly responsive
is through a forceful clause that credibly ensures the confidentiality of any infor-
mation transferred under the agreement. As long as governments are serious and
cautious about the confidentiality of their transfer procedures, this clause would
probably be a satisfactory solution. 90
Systems based on voluntary notification, like the EU's, may have to be particu-
larly responsive to business concerns. If businesses become fearful that informa-
tion they file with the Commission will be passed on to the partner country in
a bilateral agreement, they may be reluctant to notify the Commission voluntarily
of their plans. In the case of the EU, it is not clear how much the system would
actually be affected by a comprehensive agreement, 91 but it is a risk to consider.
The United Kingdom similarly relies on a voluntary notification procedure and
would be concerned that the possibility of donated information being passed
around the world could jeopardize the system. A strict confidentiality provision
in an information-exchange agreement could remedy this problem as well.
In addition to preventing the release of vital nonpublic information, confidenti-
ality laws may also be preventing the release of public information. Because
competition authorities themselves are sometimes unsure about what information
their domestic law protects, they will usually err on the side of safety and withhold
releasable information.92 Professors Whish and Wood recommend in their study
that countries take it upon themselves to clarify, both for workers in their own
Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Internationalization of Securities Fraud Enforcement in the 1990s,
25 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 119 (1992). The issue is not elaborated here, however, because
it does not arise with great frequency in the antitrust area.
87. See MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD, supra note 26, at 106.
88. U.S. -EC Notices Increase Since Accord; Confidentiality Concerns Are Downplayed, BNA
INT'L Bus. DAILY, Feb. 28, 1992.
89. See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
90. For one proposed confidentiality clause, see text at part V.B. infra.
91. Transactions that fall under block exemptions already avoid the voluntary reporting require-
ment. See WHisH, supra note 41, at 236-41. For those companies to whom the procedure applies,
they could give up significant advantages if they do not voluntarily report. See id. at 289. For a
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of notification, see Adrian Brown, Notification of
Agreements to the EC Commission: Whether to Submit to a Flawed System, 17 EUR. L. REV. 323
(1992). Note, as well, that the Commission's authority to enter into information-sharing agreements
is being called into question at the ECJ. See note 145 infra.
92. See MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD, supra note 26, at 105.
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agency and for those in foreign agencies, what information their confidentiality
laws allow and do not allow to be released.93 That exercise would certainly help
promote the sharing of public information that should be occurring even under
current arrangements.
On the flip side of confidentiality laws are the domestic laws that allow the
government to release information it holds. These laws also trigger confidentiality
concerns and would have to be changed to accommodate an effective cooperation
agreement. For example, countries may be concerned about the EU structure,
because confidential information that the EC Commission collects during the
course of an investigation may be passed on to EU Member States. Regulation
17/62 implements articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome and specifies in article
10: "The Commission shall . . .transmit to the competent authorities of the
Member States a copy of the applications and notifications together with copies
of the most important documents lodged with the Commission for the purpose
of establishing the existence of infringements of articles 85 or 86. . .. ,,14 It is
not clear whether article 10 would apply to information received from another
country under a cooperation agreement, but other countries may have concerns
about entering an agreement with the EU under which all the confidential informa-
tion they share may be sent to other countries. 95 To address such concerns, a
new EU law could simply exempt antitrust information received from a foreign
authority from this distribution requirement.
In the United States, the FOIA is designed to allow the public access to govern-
ment records.96 This act could pose a threat to confidential information exchange
between the Antitrust Division and other authorities. If foreign agencies believe
that their information is subject to release under the FOIA, they will not want
93. See id.
94. EU Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 76, art. 10. The new merger regulation in article
19 also calls for the Commission to transmit information it gets to the Member States. See WHISH,
supra note 41, at 728. For a thorough analysis of the new merger regulation, see DAMIEN NEVEN
ET AL., MERGER IN DAYLIGHT: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL
(1993).
95. Whether information received from another country's antitrust office would constitute "the
most important documents lodged with the Commission" is not certain. Council Regulation 17/62,
supra note 76, art. 10. The documents may not be "the most important" nor may they be "lodged"
which could refer to what companies themselves produce. Or, indeed, the ECJ hearing such a case
may decide that the Regulation did not envisage international information sharing, and that a new
rule must be established.
Assuming the information from another country's antitrust office does get forwarded to the EU
Member States, they are not permitted, as with any evidence forwarded from the Commission, to
use it themselves in their investigations. See Direccion General de Defensa de la Competencia v
Asociaccion Espanola de Banca Privada and Others, Case C-67/91, reprinted in Limited to Use of
Information Given to States by Commission, TIMES, Nov. 26, 1992. This rule is already a source
of tension between the EU and Member States. It could become another obstacle to agreements with
the EU if the Member States believe that the other country party to the cooperation agreement with
the EU might benefit disproportionately from the agreement because that country will be able to use
all the information that the EU transfers, whereas the Member States would be constrained.
96. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
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to transmit it. Fortunately, this quandary has been resolved in the securities area
with an exception to the FOIA, and could be likewise addressed in the antitrust
area. 97
Countries have overcome the obstacles to cooperation discussed above-dif-
fering approaches to antitrust and domestic economic protection-in exchanging
public information. The remaining confidentiality issue is a serious one, but
arrangements in other areas, and in criminal antitrust enforcement, illustrate
that it is not insurmountable.98 An exacting confidentiality provision and some
modifications to information-release statutes would provide a basic solution. Until
they reach new arrangements, however, antitrust agencies must comply with
existing bilateral and multilateral agreements and other current information-
gathering methods that are inadequate for effective antitrust enforcement.
III. Existing Arrangements for International Information-Gathering in
Antitrust Investigations
If an antitrust authority decides to prosecute foreign anticompetitive conduct
that is harming its marketplace, it will need to seek evidence from abroad. This
part demonstrates that, unfortunately, no currently available method for evidence
gathering is adequate for the lawyer or administrator in a government competition
office faced with the need to obtain information from sources located outside
the country. The investigator currently has two options: use general international
discovery methods to try to obtain information directly from the company or
individual in question; or use existing arrangements in the antitrust area to obtain
information from that country's competition office.
A. INTERNATIONAL DISCOVERY GENERALLY
An antitrust administrator who decides to obtain the information directly has
three paths to choose from: apply the domestic country's rules of discovery; use
a letter rogatory; or follow procedures outlined in the Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. 99 None of the alternatives
presents an easy and rewarding path.
The first method, applying domestic rules of discovery for taking evidence
abroad, is often lauded in countries such as the United States as "broader, swifter,
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78x(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1994) provides that information received by the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) from a foreign authority pursuant to a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) will be exempt from release under exemption 3 of FOIA, if public disclosure
would violate that country's laws. See also JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFOR-
MATION ACT, supra note 67, at 44-52 (analyzing Exemption 3).
98. See infra notes 157, 162-95 and accompanying text.
99. The Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar.
18, 1970, 23 U.S.T 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Convention].
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and less expensive" than other types of discovery.'0° For countries in which
competition authorities are permitted to use their compulsory powers abroad, 01
this approach can appear to be the simplest. However, the use of this method,
especially by the United States, has been very disruptive: "[N]o aspect of the
extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of the
United States has given rise to so much friction as the request for documents in
investigation and litigation in the United States."0 2 In civil law countries, such
as France, discovery is mostly ajudicial function, and such jurisdictions will often
not allow extraterritorial discovery. Rather, they will view requests, particularly
pretrial requests for documents, as abusive "fishing expeditions" that could
reveal commercial secrets.'0 3 Thus, an antitrust lawyer may want to reconsider
applying domestic laws to collect information abroad even if such laws allow it.
The risk of disturbing relations with the foreign country is very real because such
efforts could amount to a perceived infringement of sovereignty.°+ A country's
reaction may depend on whether the information is being solicited voluntarily
or by use of compulsory powers, but some countries, like Switzerland, allow
neither approach without supervision.'0 5 Also, because of so-called blocking stat-
utes, this direct method may be ineffective-the sensitive financial information
needed is likely to be protected by laws that prohibit nationals from revealing it.06
100. David S. Pennock, U.S. Procedures for Obtaining Discovery Abroad for Use in Proceedings
in the United States, in OBTAINING DISCOVERY ABROAD 1, 2 (ABA ed. 1990) [hereinafter ODA].
101. Germany, Sweden, and the United States, for example, allow this type of action. See COMPETi-
TION LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 28, at 26-27. The United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands
do not usually investigate entities abroad. See id. at 25-26; see also Joseph M. Steiner, Canada, in
ODA, supra note 100, at 105; Gilles de Poix, France, in ODA, supra note 100, at 49; Yoshio Ohara,
Japan, in ODA, supra note 100, at 129; Axel Epe, West Germany, in ODA, supra note 100, at 65;
Andre A. Wicki, Switzerland, in ODA, supra note 100, at 81; Edward L. Kling, United Kingdom,
in ODA, supra note 100, at 23 (lawyers and professors from Canada, France, Japan, Germany,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom discussing the discovery laws of their countries).
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442
reporter's note 1 (1987).
103. See Daniel J. Plaine & Dale Warren Dover, Compulsory Discovery Methods: The Hague
Evidence Convention, Letters Rogatory, Foreign Limits on Testimony and Document Production, in
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 197-98 (1989); de Poix, France, in ODA, supra note 100, at 51; see
also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Some Reflections on Transnational Discovery, 8 J. CoMP. Bus. & MKT.
L. 419, 419-20 (1986).
104. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 38, at 367-73; see supra notes 38-42 and accompanying
text.
105. See Robert F. Brodegaard, Effective Discovery Abroad for U.S. Courts, in INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION 155, 169 (1989); see also BORN & WESTIN, supra note 38, at 165-77 (explaining methods
for U.S. litigators when foreign witness is willing to testify).
106. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 38, at 371-73; see also Plaine & Dover, supra note 103,
at 202-05 (discussing the effectiveness of blocking statutes); COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT,
supra note 28, at 44-50 (discussing history of blocking statutes and particular examples); ABA,
supra note 16, at 150-51; see also supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (discussing the enactment
of the U.K. statute). Sometimes U.S. courts will sanction foreign parties who do not comply with
discovery orders, even though national laws prohibit them from complying. The U.S. Supreme Court
confronted the difficult issue of how courts should respond to noncompliance by a party due to a
blocking statute in Societ6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers,
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Many countries have enacted such laws, including Australia, Canada, France,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom."°7
Another disadvantage of using domestic law is that it may not prove compulsory
because a domestic court will not always be able to assert jurisdiction over the
foreign conduct or persons in question. 0 In that case, an antitrust office is left
to gather information directly from voluntary foreign sources, which is likely to
be ineffective yet still offensive to the foreign government.
In practice, one of the few ways some antitrust offices do get evidence directly
from companies located abroad is to find related domestic companies, either
subsidiaries or parents, and to apply domestic discovery procedures to gather
information through them. '09 In Canada, the European Union, Japan, Sweden, and
the United States, for example, competition authorities may use their compulsory
powers under domestic law to solicit information from companies located within
their respective territories about related companies outside." 0
Letters rogatory are another available discovery method. In use for decades,
they involve the transmission from one country's judiciary to another, through
diplomatic channels, of a request for assistance in gathering evidence for a pending
case."' Parties apply to their own judiciary, which in turn decides whether or
not to execute a letter. If it does, the letter is transmitted to the other country's
judiciary, which is bound only by comity to execute the request, and does so
according to only its domestic law." 2 Though they have the advantage of not
offending a foreign country's sovereignty," 3 letters rogatory have been criticized
for being slow, expensive, and unpredictable."1
4
357 U.S. 197 (1958). The Court adopted a two-part inquiry in which it first asked whether or not
to order discovery, and then whether to apply sanctions. The Court weighed several factors in its
analysis, including the importance of the evidence and the nationality of the party. For a thorough
discussion of Soci&dlntemationale and its progeny, see BORN & WESTIN, supra note 38, at 374-405.
What is not clear is whether the threat of sanctions leads to the discovery of foreign evidence, or
if the foreign parties just accept sanctions.
107. See Pennock, supra note 100, at 18-22; BORN & WESTIN, supra note 38, at 372-73.
108. Forjurisdiction issues in U.S. courts, see BORN & WESTIN, supra note 38, at 354, 357-60.
Courts in other countries have different requirements for their extraterritorial jurisdiction, but many,
including those in Canada, Japan, Germany, and the United States, rely on an "effects" test, which
allows them to assert jurisdiction over the conduct if effects are felt in their territory. See ABA,
supra note 16, at 148; see also COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 28, at 39-44 (discussing
different countries' jurisdictional requirements). The EC Commission has also recognized this doc-
trine, but the ECJ has not. See WHISH, supra note 41, at 374.
109. See COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 28, at 30-32; BORN & WESTIN, supra
note 38, at 355-56.
110. See COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 28, at 30-31. Of particular interest are
Canadian search and seizure provisions that allow authorities to "search" computer data bases that
may be linked electronically to information sources abroad.
111. See Plaine & Dover, supra note 103, at 193-94; see also BORN & WESTIN, supra note 38,
at 406-10 (general discussion of letters rogatory).
112. See Brodegaard, supra note 105, at 162; BORN & WESTIN, supra note 38, at 407.
113. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 38, at 406.
114. Id. at 408.
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A government competition investigator's final option is to use the Hague Evi-
dence Convention." 5 Opened for signature on March 18, 1970, the Convention
represents an effort by member countries to standardize and simplify the proce-
dures by which evidence is sought from abroad. 16 Many civil law countries
consider this Convention to be the only way foreign parties can take evidence
from their citizens. 117 The Convention provides for three methods of collecting
evidence abroad-by letter of request, by consular or diplomatic official, or by
appointed commissioner. The first method can be compulsory, while authorities
can only use the latter two with willing witnesses. "' A judicial authority in one
contracting state sends letters of request to the designated "central authority"
of another contracting state, requesting that a competent authority there "obtain
evidence, or . . .perform some other judicial act.',' 1 9 The Convention details
all the specific information that the request must contain and instructs the executing
authority to apply its own laws "expeditiously" to carry out the request. 2 0 The
Convention also specifies that witnesses may refuse to comply where a privilege
is recognized in their own country or in the country where the request originated
applies. 2' The letter of request differs from the letter rogatory in that a treaty
obligation compels countries to cooperate in the case of the former, whereas
only comity binds the foreign court in the latter. 122 The Convention methods of
consular, diplomatic, and commissioner-assisted testimony are not available in
every contracting state, and, in some states, authorities must first seek permission
to use them. These methods are only applicable to proceedings that have already
commenced, unlike letters of request, which may be used during pretrial. Essen-
tially, the Convention provides that a consular official from the contracting state
seeking the evidence, or a commissioner whom a judicial authority from that
state appoints, may assist in gathering information.1
23
The Convention is not very useful for discovery in government competition
proceedings, and neither the U.S., Canadian, nor EU competition offices have
ever used it to obtain information from abroad. First, many countries have joined
in an exception to the Convention that prohibits its use for pretrial document
discovery.' 24 The Convention, therefore, is not helpful for investigative work.
115. Convention, supra note 99; see BORN & WESTIN, supra note 38, at 411-47.
116. See Brodegaard, supra note 105, at 157. Current parties to the Convention include: Argentina,
Barbados, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Mo-
naco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Pennock, supra note 100, at 8.
117. See de Poix, France, in ODA, supra note 100, at 51-52.
118. See Pennock, supra note 100, at 9.
119. Convention, supra note 99, art. 1.
120. Id. arts. 4, 9.
121. Id. art. 11.
122. See Plaine & Dover, supra note 103, at 196.
123. See Pennock, supra note 100, at 10; Convention, supra note 99, arts. 15-22.
124. Convention, supra note 99, art. 23; see BORN & WESTIN, supra note 38, at 415.
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Second, the Convention only applies to civil or commercial matters. The Conven-
tion will not apply in the case of a criminal antitrust proceeding that some coun-
tries, notably Canada and the United States, may have. Moreover, some countries
may not consider even a noncriminal antitrust case filed by the government to
be a civil or commercial matter, but an administrative one. 125 Countries such as
the United Kingdom have also entered into exceptions that allow them to abrogate
cooperation for certain reasons, such as state security. 126 Finally, some agencies
have found that even when they have been successful in obtaining information
under the Convention, "the time and expense expended . . . has been substan-
tial," especially when compared to procedures under effective bilaterals. 127
Because none of these discovery methods effectively allows antitrust offices
to gather evidence in other countries, many agencies simply do not obtain informa-
tion from abroad unless they can do so with the company or person's cooperation,
or by finding a subsidiary or parent in their own country. Illegal conduct, as a
result, can fall through the cracks-not prosecuted because authorities lack suffi-
cient evidence.
B. CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS IN THE COMPETITION AREA
Because standard international discovery methods are likely to prove ineffective
or time-consuming, a lawyer or administrator in a competition office may try
to obtain the necessary information by cooperating with antitrust offices in other
countries who also might have an interest in the case. These offices may already
have gathered the desired information using domestic discovery procedures, or
they may be prepared to do so.
Unfortunately, current antitrust arrangements are inadequate to foster effective
cooperation between offices. Although they may overcome the obstacles dis-
cussed above, such as differing approaches to antitrust, the existing arrangements
do not modify (or encourage the modification of) strict domestic confidentiality
laws. In addition, they do not provide for cooperation, such as in the gathering
of evidence, on behalf of a foreign authority.
1. Multilateral Efforts
Under the auspices of international organizations such as the United Nations
and the OECD, countries have participated in several initiatives designed to
125. This issue has apparently not been fully resolved. At least one authority claims that the
Convention is not applicable to agency investigations in any case. See ABA, supra note 16, at 202.
But another authority seems to imply that it may vary by country. For example, France would
probably not allow the Convention to apply in instances when the government itself is bringing a
case in the antitrust field. See de Poix, France, in ODA, supra note 100, at 53. However, the United
Kingdom may allow it. Kling, United Kingdom, in ODA, supra note 100, at 25.
126. Micheal D. Mann & Joseph G. Mari, Current Issues in International Securities Law Enforce-
ment, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 51, 131 (1989).
127. See id. (experience in the securities context).
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facilitate the sharing of antitrust information. For example, in 1980 the United
Nations adopted a set of principles regarding restrictive business practices. The
information-sharing recommendations suggest that countries share information
consistent with their domestic laws and that they establish mechanisms to facilitate
such exchanges.128
The OECD has also issued several nonbinding recommendations regarding
antitrust enforcement. In 1979, the OECD adopted a recommendation with infor-
mation exchange, notification, and coordination provisions that have been exten-
sively used. 2 9 In 1986, the OECD revised the recommendation,130 and currently,
it suggests that countries notify each other when they undertake enforcement
activities and that "they . . . supply each other with such relevant information
on restrictive business practices as their legitimate interests permit them to dis-
close" and insofar as their domestic laws permit. 3' An appendix to the revised
recommendation states that countries providing information may specify with
what degree of confidentiality they want their information to be protected, and
for how long.' 32 The 1986 recommendation has encouraged countries to make
regular notifications to each other about their enforcement activities. From Octo-
ber 1, 1991, to March 3, 1993, countries sent one another over three hundred
notifications and requests under the recommendation.
Although the European Union operates under no separate multilateral
agreement, it presents a unique example because some confidential information
is exchanged between the European Commission and its Member States. Under
EU Regulation 17/62, the Commission must forward some confidential informa-
tion to the Member States, 133 and they in turn are obligated to provide information
upon the request of EU investigators.' 34 Cooperation between the EU and its
Member States is more developed than elsewhere. Even so, cooperation among
the Member States themselves for local enforcement is not generally available.
Though these multilateral arrangements represent steps in the right direction,
none of them, aside from the unique example of the EU, tackles the issues of
confidential information exchange and significant cooperation in evidence gather-
ing. Neither, unfortunately, do the bilateral arrangements in the antitrust area,
except in the criminal context, which comprises only a fraction of international
antitrust cases.
128. See COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 28, at 69-70.
129. OECD Doc. C(79)154 (Final) (Oct. 5 1979); see COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra
note 28, at 69.
130. OECD Doc. C(86)44 (Final) (May 21, 1986).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 76, art. 10.
134. Id. art. 11(1). For an article that describes the general procedural relationship between the
EU and one of its Member States, see Rainer Bechtold, Antitrust Law in the European Community
and Germany-An Uncoordinated Co-Existence?, INT'L ANTITRUST L. & POL'Y (1992).
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2. Bilateral Arrangements
Several countries have adopted bilateral arrangements that address specifically
the issue of mutual assistance in antitrust, including notification of activities,
enforcement cooperation, and information exchange. 135 Agreements concluded
to date include EU-United States (1991),136 Canada-United States (1984), 131 Ger-
many-France (1984), 13s Australia-New Zealand (1990), 139 Australia-United States
(1981),' ° Germany-United States (1976),' a' and a provision in the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement. 142 The EU and Canada and the EU and Japan are
considering entering into agreements. 143 The French Minister of the Economy
has also mentioned that France and the United States were contemplating a similar
step. 144
In order to understand the extent of efforts so far in the competition area, the
Agreement Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws between the
United States and the European Union, signed on September 23, 1991, will be ex-
amined as a representative and recent example. 14 The preamble states that the
agreement was adopted, in part, out of the recognition that "the world's economies
are becoming increasingly interrelated" and that the enforcement of competition
laws would be enhanced by cooperation. 146 The first article of the Agreement sets
out its purpose, "to promote cooperation and coordination and lessen the possibility
of impact of differences between the Parties in the application of their competition
laws."1 47 The preamble then defines what laws, authorities, and conduct fall under
135. In addition, some Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties have sections that propose
consultations between the parties to eliminate the effects of restrictive business practices, but they
have not been often, if ever, invoked. See COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 28, at 65.
136. Agreement Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, EC-U.S.,
30 I.L.M. 1487 [hereinafter EC-U.S. Agreement].
137. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Canada as to Notification, Consultation, and Cooperation with Respect to
the Application of National Antitrust Laws, Mar. 9, 1984, Can.-U.S., 23 I.L.M. 275.
138. Agreement Concerning Cooperation on Restrictive Business Practices, May 28, 1984,
F.R.G.-Fr., 26 I.L.M. 531.
139. Closer Economic Relations-Trade Agreement, Mar. 28, 1983, Austl.-N.Z., 22 I.L.M. 945.
140. Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, U.S.-Austl., 34
U.S.T. 388.
141. Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June
23, 1976, U.S.-F.R.G., 27 U.S.T. 1956.
142. See MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD, supra note 26, at 192.
143. See WHISH, supra note 41, at 729.
144. See France, U.S. Approach Agreement on Antitrust Cooperation, Assistance, BNA INT'L
Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Dec. 10, 1993.
145. EC-U.S. Agreement, supra note 136, at 1491. For a discussion of this agreement as related
to further convergence, see James F. Rill & Virginia R. Metallo, The Next Step: Convergence of
Procedure & Enforcement, INT'L ANTITRUST L. & POL'Y 15 (1992). France is now accusing the
EU of not having had the authority to enter into this agreement with the United States. EU: Court
of Justice Says Commission Not Competent to Sign Competition Agreement with USA, AGENCE
EUROPE, Mar. 5, 1994.
146. EC-U.S. Agreement, supra note 136, at 1491.
147. Id. at 1492.
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the jurisdiction of the Agreement. Article II, entitled "Notification," describes
the process by which the competition offices will keep each other informed as to
their respective activities. The parties agree to notify each other about enforcement
activities that" may affect important interests of the other Party." 148 Those interests
are subsequently defined, and include anticompetitive behavior carried out in the
other party's territory, mergers or acquisitions that involve a company incorpo-
rated under the laws of the other party, action that the other party somehow encour-
aged, or possible remedies that would involve conduct within the other party's terri-
tory. Unlike any bilateral agreement in the competition field that has come before
it, the EU-U.S. Agreement sets out a timetable by which some information, such
as merger notifications, is to be relayed.' 49
Article III states that the competition authorities of each party will meet at
least twice a year, both to exchange information about their enforcement activities
and important economic sectors, and to discuss potential policy changes and any
other relevant topics. The article also commits the parties to provide each other
spontaneously with information that may be relevant to potential or existing
enforcement actions. Upon the receipt of a specific request from a party, the
Agreement states that the other party should provide relevant information that
it has to the requesting party, provided that releasing the information would be
within the limits of articles VIII and IX; that is, the release would not violate
any existing domestic laws, including those of confidentiality. 1"0 Article VIII,
"Confidentiality of Information," provides in part:
Each Party agrees to maintain, to the fullest extent possible, the confidentiality of any
information provided to it in confidence by the other Party under this Agreement and
to oppose, to the fullest extent possible, any application for disclosure of such information
by a third party that is not authorized by the Party that supplied the information.' 5'
Despite the progress it represents, the EU-U.S. bilateral agreement still does not
permit the exchange of the most crucial information-that which is confidential. It
does not call for a modification of domestic confidentiality laws so that competition
agencies could share this information with one another. Also, the two competition
authorities cannot use their compulsory powers of evidence gathering on one
another's behalf; although article IV provides for cooperation and coordination
of enforcement activities, it again is limited by domestic law, which does not
provide for this kind of assistance. The Agreement does not suggest that those
laws be changed.
The EU-U.S. bilateral agreement attempts to solve the obstacles of differing
antitrust policies and conflicting economic interests through increased communi-
148. Id. at 1493.
149. Joseph Griffin, E. C. -U.S. Agreement on Antitrust Already Has Had Impact on Business,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 13, 1992, at 31.
150. EC-U.S. Agreement, supra note 136, at 1496.
151. Id. at 1501.
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cation, but it does not address the issue of confidentiality, presumably for the
reasons, among others, of EU structure discussed above.' 52 The bilateral
agreement, nevertheless, has had an effect on the way the United States and the
EU communicate regarding their competition activities. Like many authorities,
the U.S. and EU offices communicated casually before the bilateral agreement,
but now "[e]nforcement officials on both sides of the Atlantic have made it clear
that since the Agreement, the flow of information between them has increased
significantly.' ' 153 Commentators have also predicted that this Agreement will
lead toward "more of a convergence in enforcement policies" because the offices
will share information about, for example, how they define the relevant market
in a merger case.154
The United States is party to another bilateral instrument that provides for
more active cooperation. The Treaty Between the Government of Canada and
the Government of the United States on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters (MLAT), entered into force in early 1990, covers assistance in criminal
cases generally, but has been used frequently and successfully by both countries
to obtain information for criminal antitrust proceedings. The MLAT provides
for a large variety of assistance and even permits parties to use their compulsory
powers to gather evidence for one another. "' Both the United States and Canada
have done so on the other's behalf. In addition, no part of the MLAT prohibits
or limits the trading of confidential information, and article XIII(2) provides that
"[t]he Requested State may provide copies of any document, record or informa-
tion in the possession of a government department or agency, but not publicly
available, to the same extent and under the same conditions as would be available
to its own law enforcement and judicial authorities."' 56 This clause clearly con-
templates the sharing of confidential information, and Canada and the United
States have exchanged such information under the MLAT. Article IX permits
the requested state to specify that the information it reveals is treated confidentially
by the requesting state. The treaty only applies in cases of criminal antitrust
prosecutions, which make up the minority of cases in Canada and the United
States and do not exist in countries with solely civil competition laws. However,
according to the authorities involved, the MLAT has proved to be a powerful
tool and has significantly aided antitrust enforcement efforts."'
152. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
153. See Griffin, supra note 149, at 33; see also Griffin, supra note 36, at 55.
154. Barbara Franklin, Antitrust Accord; FTC, EC Agree to Share Enforcement Information, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 2, 1992, at 5 (quoting Barry Hawk).
155. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, March 18, 1985, Can.-U.S., 24
I.L.M. 1092, arts. II, VI, VII, XII.
156. Id. art. XIII(2).
157. Telephone Interview with Charles S. Stark, Chief of Foreign Commerce Section of Antitrust
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (Nov. 3, 1993); see also Metzenbaum, Brooks to Introduce
Bill to Give New Negotiating Authority to DOJ, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, June 15, 1994
[hereinafter Metzenbaum] (MLAT helped the United States break up a plastic dinnerware cartel).
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The MLAT did not require implementing legislation in the United States and
simply supersedes domestic laws, such as those regarding confidentiality, that
would ordinarily prevent the assistance. Canada did pass legislation that brought
its domestic law into conformity with MLAT's that it has signed. 151 In the case
of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or agreement, implementing laws
that allow the parties to do what they have agreed to are a crucial part of any
effective regime. A new law the U.S. Department of Justice sponsored, modeled
after 1988 SEC legislation, specifies changes in domestic law that will allow the
United States to release and accept confidential information for use in investiga-
tions and prosecutions pursuant to an international agreement. 159 For example,
the law provides that section 4 of the Antitrust Civil Process Act will no longer
prevent the U.S. Attorney General from providing evidence to a foreign authority
for an antitrust investigation.60
IV. Precedents for a More Comprehensive Instrument
The bilateral agreements concluded to date in the antitrust arena could form
foundations for comprehensive instruments in the future. As of now, however,
most are not useful for the sharing or collection of confidential information.
Other areas in international finance have taken more substantial steps toward full
cooperation by calling for legislation that changes domestic laws. Specifically,
some agreements in the areas of tax, money laundering, and securities have made
significant progress in information sharing. 16' These agreements could be useful
as models for future efforts toward more extensive cooperation in international
antitrust.
An important difference between these areas and antitrust is that in these areas
of enforcement, the conduct at issue, such as tax evasion or insider trading,
consists of attempts by individuals to evade laws that benefit the general popula-
tion. In competition cases, the conduct at issue may involve even more serious
injury to the public, but may seem less egregious because the cases are complicated
and do not readily offer single guilty individuals. Antitrust authorities seeking
forward-looking agreements may, therefore, have a difficult time convincing
their legislatures that such agreements are as necessary in the area of competition
as in the areas below.
158. See Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, ch. 37, 1988 S.C. 1007 (Can.).
159. Clinton Signs Bill, supra note 11.
160. The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-438,
§ 6 (1993); supra note 73-74 and accompanying text. In 1992 Australia unilaterally enacted a similar
law, the Mutual Assistance in Business Regulation Act, which provides a mechanism for the govern-
ment to assist overseas regulators with collecting information for criminal prosecutions, including
those in antitrust. Mutual Assistance in Business Regulation Act, No. 25, AUSTL. C. ACTS (1992).
161. For a detailed treatment of arrangements in all these areas, see Mutual Assistance Agreements,
OECD, DAFFE/CLP/WP3(93)3 [hereinafter Mutual Assistance].
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A. TAX
The problems of international tax evasion and double taxation have long con-
cerned many governments. They have negotiated numerous bilateral as well as
multilateral treaties in the area of taxation in response. 162 In 1992, member coun-
tries to the OECD revised a model bilateral treaty, the OECD Model Tax Conven-
tion on Income and Capital, drafted originally in 1963, and agreed that their own
bilateral agreements would conform to the model. 63 Article 26 provides that:
The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such information
as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Convention. . . . Any information
received by a Contracting State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as informa-
tion obtained under the domestic laws of that State and shall be disclosed only to
persons or authorities (including courts and administrative bodies) involved [in a relevant
taxation case]. 1'
This section of the Convention contemplates the sharing of confidential informa-
tion, but it is limited by domestic laws of the Contracting States regarding trade
secrets and public policy. The commentary on article 26 cautions that "[s]ecrets
mentioned in this sub-paragraph should not be taken in too wide a sense." 65
Despite the limitation by domestic law, member countries have exchanged
information. Recently, the OECD issued guidelines regarding article 26 designed
to make information transfer between tax authorities under tax bilateral
agreements more efficient.'66 The survey taken of OECD member countries as part
of the project revealed several positive trends regarding confidential information
sharing. Most countries believe that their tax secrecy provisions do not block
information exchange (unlike in the antitrust area)167 and that they can sometimes
overcome banking secrecy problems in the tax area. 68 One half of the member
countries reported no restrictions on releasing confidential information, and others
have very narrow definitions of what information is secret and nonreleasable.' 69
No case was offered in which information was withheld for confidentiality rea-
sons. The guideline authors concluded that "the recognition of trade and business
secrets [do not] constitute a serious obstacle for the exchange of information"
in the tax area.'70 In addition to the matrix of tax bilaterals agreements, several
162. See id. at 35 (chart showing all the tax bilaterals as of January 1992).
163. See id. at 2, 33.
164. Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, art. 26(1), Report of the Committee on
Fiscal Affairs, OECD (Dec. 14, 1960).
165. Id.
166. OECD, Working Party No. 8 of Committee on Fiscal Affairs on Tax Avoidance and Evasion,
Exchange of Information, Revised Guidelines for the Competent Authorities, DAFFE/CFA(93)6/
REVI, Sept. 2, 1993.
167. See id. at 25.
168. See id. at 26-27.
169. See id. at 63.
170. See id. at 28.
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multilateral arrangements exist in the tax field. 71 Notably, the Nordic Convention
allows for the possibility of tax officials participating in examinations abroad. '
72
B. MONEY LAUNDERING
The largest hurdle in nations' efforts to combat money laundering has tradition-
ally been national banking secrecy laws. 73 Some instruments in the money laun-
dering context, however, have overcome this problem. For example, article 5(3)
of the U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, 174 entered into force in 1990, states that "each Party shall empower its
courts or other competent authorities to order that bank, financial or commercial
records be made available or be seized. A Party shall not decline to act under
the provisions of this paragraph on the ground of bank secrecy." The Convention
also allows nations to use their compulsory powers on behalf of other nations
in furtherance of money-laundering investigations or prosecutions. 
75
The 1990 Council of Europe Convention goes further. First, it applies to money
laundering in all cases, not just when linked to drug trafficking. Second, chapter
III, section 2 contemplates the cooperation of parties in a broad variety of ways
including "any measure providing and securing evidence."' 76 This provision
allows for extensive cooperation in confiscation. Article 7 directs countries to
adopt legislation allowing authorities to confiscate on each others' behalf. If
countries take that suggestion to heart, impressive cooperation could result. The
Convention includes a provision on confidentiality, article 33, which requires
that the requesting party keep the information confidential or inform the requested
party if it cannot. This Convention, however, does not suggest that countries
should change their national confidentiality laws.
Most information sharing in the money-laundering context takes place under
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs). Over one hundred of these
agreements direct cooperation with respect to criminal matters among many coun-
tries. 77 Like the Canada-U.S. MLAT discussed in part V.B.2. above, these
agreements provide for an impressive range of assistance, including evidence-
171. See, e.g., Council Directive 77/799 on Mutual Assistance in the Field of Direct Taxation,
1977 O.J. (L 336) 15-20. Nordic Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters (enforced since
May 1991); Council of Europe/OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax
Matters (signed in 1988, and not yet entered into force).
172. See Mutual Assistance, supra note 161, at 7.
173. These laws can also pose a barrier to antitrust enforcement, but such conflicts do not arise
frequently. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
174. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, Dec. 20, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. No. 101-4 (1990).
175. Id. arts. V, VII.
176. 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of
the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990.
177. For example, Canada has concluded agreements with Hong Kong, the Bahamas, Mexico,
and the Netherlands.
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gathering, access to files, and interviewing of witnesses.' 78 Few, if any, of these
treaties prohibit the exchange of confidential information, and some encourage
it. Depending on domestic laws, the countries may share such information and
have done so frequently.
C. SECURITIES
The information-sharing provisions in the area of securities are the most ad-
vanced of any area of international financial cooperation. As in the field of
antitrust, "[olne of the greatest difficulties of investigating illegal cross-border
conduct is gathering evidence. . . . [E]fforts to obtain evidence from abroad can
involve the expenditure of substantial time and resources. ,179 In reaction to these
difficulties, countries have built numerous bilateral agreements that comprise an
effective system in which parties may fully cooperate with one another, even
regarding confidential information. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) has concluded nonbinding agreements with its counterparts in seven-
teen other countries and in the EU, and many of the parties use these agreements
extensively. 180 The agreements are varied, but the Memorandum of Understand-
ing Concerning Consultation and Cooperation in the Administration and Enforce-
ment of Securities Laws (MOU), between the SEC and the Comision Nacional
del Mercado de Valores of Spain (concluded on July 8, 1992) provides a recent
example.
Clause 3, section 2 of the MOU outlines a large scope of possible assistance
between the two countries, including providing access to files, taking testimony
and statements from witnesses, obtaining documents, and conducting inspections
for each other. 181 Further provisions of the MOU contain instructions on the
content of requests and how they are to be processed. Under the confidentiality
section, the parties agreed to use their best efforts to keep the requests and all
information obtained by them confidential. 82 The cornerstone of the MOU in-
volves the crucial question of implementing legislation. Without domestic laws
that permit broad assistance, the authorities are helpless to comply with requests
for confidential information or evidence gathering. Although the MOU points out
178. See, e.g., United Kingdom Model Agreement Concerning Mutual Assistance in Relation to
Drug Trafficking, May 1990.
179. James R. Doty, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in an Internationalized
Marketplace, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 577, 583 (1992).
180. The countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, France, Hungary, Indonesia,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom; see SEC Agreements with Regulatory Authorities of Other Countries, at 1 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 84-7022, 1993); Memorandum of Understanding
Signed by SEC, Australian Securities Commission, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 21, 1993.
181. Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation in the Administra-
tion and Enforcement of Security Laws cl. 3, § 1(2).
182. Id. cl. 3, § 6 (1,2).
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that its provisions do not "supersede domestic law,"' 83 it nevertheless instructs the
parties to "use all reasonable efforts to recommend to the appropriate authority
that legislation be enacted, or to obtain the assistance of other government agencies
or entities that have such authority" in order to provide assistance.i14
A number of countries have enacted the critical legislation needed to allow their
securities authorities to share confidential information and to use their compulsory
powers to help other countries gather evidence. In 1990, for example, U.S.
lawmakers enacted legislation allowing the SEC to share information:
The Commission may, in its discretion and upon a showing that such information is
needed, provide ... information in its possession to such persons, both domestic and
foreign, as the Commission by rule deems appropriate if the person receiving such
records or information provides such assurances of confidentiality as the Commission
deems appropriate.s 5
Also, the SEC is now permitted to use its compulsory powers on behalf of another
government, taking into account issues of reciprocity and of the U.S. public
interest.' 6 Any information it receives from a foreign government is protected
from domestic disclosure.
87
Section 47 of Australia's National Companies and Securities Commission Act
indicates that the Commission may disclose documents or information in its
possession "if, in the opinion of the Commission, it is in the public interest."
8 8
Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom all have some form of legislation that allows
them to cooperate to a greater or lesser extent with foreign securities authorities. 8 9
Some countries adopted such legislation after signing MOUs in the securities
field. In addition to overcoming securities confidentiality laws as the Spain-U.S.
bilateral MOU does, the Switzerland-U.S. Treaty on Mutual Assistance has
prompted Switzerland to establish a mechanism by which banks can disclose
information, in some situations, without violating Swiss bank secrecy laws.' 9
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) prepared
a set of principles in 1991 to guide countries in drafting additional securities
instruments. 9 One of the draft MOU principles is a confidentiality provision
that guarantees that foreign information will be treated at least as carefully as
183. Id. cl. 3, § 2(1).
184. Id. cl. 3, § 1(3).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 78x(c) (Supp. IV 1992). At the end of 1993 the Commission adopted rule 24c-1
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which lists the various types of people who may be
able to receive nonpublic information. See Access to Nonpublic Information in the Commission's
Possession, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,416 (1993) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 203, 240).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2) (1988).
187. Id. § 78x(d) (Supp. IV 1992).
188. Mutual Assistance Agreements, supra note 161, at 18.
189. See id. at 18-19.
190. See id. at 30.
191. Working Party No. 4 of the Technical Committee, International Organization of Securities
Commissions, Principles for Memoranda of Understanding, Sept. 1991.
SPRING 1995
146 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
domestic information under the requesting party's laws. Another principle sug-
gests a public-policy exception to compliance, and another describes a broad set
of possible types of cooperation. 192
There have been efforts at multilateral agreements in the securities area as
well. For example, the Council of Europe Convention on Insider Trading came
into force in October 1991.' 9' It provides for the communication between the
securities authorities of signatory states of otherwise confidential information. 94
An EU Directive allows for a similar type of cooperation. 195
The network of agreements in the securities field is an example for antitrust
arrangements to follow. Countries share confidential information and use their
compulsory powers to gather evidence on one another's behalf. Antitrust agencies
could point legislators to the securities example and remind them that the harm
to consumers that can come from unchecked competition abuses can be as great
as, if not greater than, the damage from violations of securities laws.
V. Strengthening Enforcement in International Antitrust: A Blueprint
for Mutual Assistance
In light of the pressing need for better information-sharing and cooperation
arrangements, the nascent efforts in the antitrust field, and the strong precedents
for cooperation in other fields, the following blueprint for a progressive mutual
assistance agreement would provide competition authorities with the tools they
need to prosecute international anticompetitive behavior. Inspired in part by ex-
isting bilateral agreements and the IOSCO guidelines, the ten principles offered
can provide the basis for agreements for cooperation in the antitrust field. 196 For
example, now that a new law gives the FTC and the Department of Justice the
power to cooperate under antitrust mutual assistance agreements, those future
agreements could be based on the model below. 97
The most imposing hurdle to implementation of a final agreement is reform
of domestic laws so the parties-countries or their antitrust agencies-can realize
the full cooperation envisioned by the agreement. Therefore, the following princi-
ples identify the places in which domestic law may prevent the stated objectives.
Any final agreement should have clauses that encourage or require the parties
to seek such necessary legal modifications.
192. Id. at 8-9.
193. See Mutual Assistance Agreements, supra note 161, at 16.
194. See id.
195. Id.
196. The Canada-U.S. MLAT, supra note 155, the EC-U.S. Agreement, supra note 136, and
the Spain-U.S. SEC MOU, supra note 181, were the primary models used.
197. The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 contains guidelines that the
U.S. would need to follow in drafting agreements. Pub. L. No. 101-438, § 12.
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A. PURPOSE AND DEFINITIONS
Antitrust cooperation agreements should clearly describe the purpose and de-
fine the terms contained in the document. The purpose will likely be to "promote
cooperation and coordination" 98 among antitrust authorities, and to better arrest
international anticompetitive behavior. Many international agreements begin with
a similar section to establish a common understanding of terminology and direc-
tion between the parties.
B. CONFIDENTIALITY
The confidentiality provision of an antitrust cooperation agreement is one of
the most crucial because much of the information countries will seek to exchange
is nonpublic. It must be strong enough to assure authorities that the businesses
under investigation will not be penalized by leaks of sensitive information. This
concern has been one of the major barriers to better agreements.
An agreement should provide that the requested party specify exactly how it
expects any confidential information that it transfers to be treated. The agreement
should require the requesting party to inform the requested party prior to transmis-
sion if it is unable to comply with the outlined requirements. Parties should also
agree to punish, criminally or otherwise, staff in competition agencies who do
not comply with confidentiality requirements. Finally, agreements should provide
that, to the extent that their domestic laws do not allow the parties to provide
adequate confidentiality assurances for foreign material, parties should seek a
change in their domestic laws.
While other confidentiality provisions are possible, this version allows the
countries, in good faith, to set their own confidentiality standards. Some
agreements have a provision which states that the requesting party will treat the
information it receives the way it would treat similar domestic information. This
type of a provision, though it offers more predictable standards, may not be
an adequate assurance in situations where the requested party's confidentiality
provisions are stricter than those of the requesting party.
C. PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
The parties will only accept an agreement that exempts them from compliance in
extreme situations. Parties should not be able to avail themselves of this exception
whenever compliance is inconvenient, so the exception should be narrowly tai-
lored. The agreement should permit the requested party to decline to assist only
when doing so would jeopardize its sovereignty, national security or other vital
public policy interests, or when the request is not in accordance with the provisions
of the agreement. Agreements should also require that when a requested party
198. EC-U.S. Agreement, supra note 136, at 1492.
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refuses to cooperate, that party should promptly notify the requesting party of
its reasons.
D. SCOPE OF COOPERATION
The agreement should allow for a broad scope of possible assistance so the
parties can aid each other to the full extent they are willing. As in other provisions,
it is critical that the agreement encourage the parties to seek changes in their
national laws to allow all types of cooperation. At a minimum, assistance available
under the agreement should, first, provide access to information in the public
and non-public files of the requested party. If either party is prohibited from
sharing confidential information, it should seek a change in the domestic law
that restricts sharing. This change is, of course, a crucial step in ensuring that
the agreement is effective. Second, the agreement should cover taking testimony
from persons and obtaining documents. If a party does not have the authority
to use its compulsory powers on behalf of another government, it should seek that
authority from its legislature. This power could prove to be important, because a
foreign antitrust authority may not have investigated the company in question,
and therefore will not have the desired information on hand. Finally, parties
should be allowed to coordinate enforcement activities when they agree that such
coordination would be beneficial.
E. SUBJECT MATTER
An agreement must specify which kinds of cases fall within its jurisdiction.
Although the purpose and definition section will limit jurisdiction to competition
investigations, the agreement should also require the requested party to assist
the requesting party regardless of whether the conduct under investigation would
be illegal under the requested party's laws (unless the requested party would be
prevented from assisting under those circumstances by its laws). This provision
would allow the parties to avoid long, substantive legal discussions about the
cases and their respective competition laws. If under its domestic laws, a party
is only allowed to render assistance for a case involving conduct that would be
illegal under its own laws, the agreement should suggest that it seek a change
in that law.
F. PERMITTED USES
To further assure parties that shared sensitive information will not be used for
unauthorized purposes, an agreement should provide that the requesting party
may only use the information it receives for the purpose or purposes specified
in its request, for example, as evidence in a prosecution. Should the requesting
party want to use the information in another way, or share it with another agency,
the agreement should require that it first obtain permission from the requested
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party. Alternatively, the parties could agree that the information may be shared
with certain related domestic agencies and be used for purposes in the general
framework of that stated in the request.'99
G. NOTIFICATION
If the authorities keep each other abreast of matters on which their offices are
working, they will find it easier to cooperate and coordinate. An agreement should
contain a provision that parties notify one another of actions they plan to take,
or information that they have received, that might be relevant to the other party.
In addition, the agreement should allow parties to notify each other when they
learn of illegal conduct that is harming the other party's interests. In the case
of such conduct, the parties should consult regarding appropriate enforcement
measures. This provision could supplement the OECD notification system already
in place. 2°°
H. CONSULTATION
To ensure that cooperation under the agreement occurs as smoothly as possible,
the agreement should encourage the parties to consult regarding any matter related
to the agreement at the request of either party. The parties should meet annually
at the minimum. In general, the agreement should ask that the parties keep each
other's interests in mind whenever possible.2 '
I. PROCEDURE FOR ASSISTANCE
The agreement should set out a fairly detailed procedure for cooperation so
that authorities know what their obligations are and what their expectations should
be. The agreement should define specific procedures both for how assistance
should be requested and for how the requests should be implemented. The exis-
tence of the request and of any response to it should be kept confidential. Requests
for assistance should include: requirements for confidentiality; a basic description
of the case as well as the purpose for which the information is sought; legal
provisions pertaining to the matter; a general description of the type of assistance
to be rendered; a suggested time period for a reply; and any other information
that might help the requested party locate the evidence needed or the persons to
be interviewed.
The requests should be promptly processed according to the domestic proce-
dures of the requested party unless the parties agree otherwise. To the extent
permitted by the law of the requested party, a representative of the requesting
199. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Signed by SEC, Australian Securities Commission.
200. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
201. This concept is like the "positive comity" concept in article V of the EC-U.S. bilateral
agreement. See EC-U.S. Agreement, supra note 136, at 1497-98.
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party may participate directly in the execution of a request. The parties may also
want to consider establishing time periods for the acknowledgment and processing
of requests.
J. COST-SHARING
Because the costs of gathering and conveying information might be substantial,
the parties should decide on a rule regarding costs. If one party, for example,
incurred significant expenses in deposing several witnesses on behalf of another,
it should not have to disrupt the information transfer procedure to ask for reim-
bursement. Agreements should provide that if the requested party anticipates
incurring substantial costs in executing a request for assistance, that it may consult
with the requesting party regarding a cost-sharing arrangement before continuing
to respond to the request.
VI. Implementation
An important final consideration for establishing a regime of comprehensive
cooperation is the effective implementation of the principles. The most efficient
and progressive solution would be an arrangement in which a group of countries
enter a multilateral agreement under which they all freely share information
according to the above principles. Unlike a system of bilateral agreements, this
agreement would not force countries to repeat similar work in drafting and negoti-
ation for different partners. In addition, this method negates the risk of leaving
certain pairs of countries unlinked. Further, a multilateral agreement would foster
cooperation on a large scale and would make it difficult for anticompetitive
conduct to go unchecked. A multilateral agreement could also lead to greater
communication between many nations, resulting in more substantive convergence
and perhaps even an international antitrust authority. Unfortunately, there is not
enough support among countries at the present time for a progressive multilateral
agreement.
Perhaps the best alternative solution, then, is to establish a network of bilateral
agreements, as in the securities area, supplemented by efforts toward a multilateral
agreement. An organization such as the OECD could recommend that its members
incorporate the above principles into new or existing antitrust bilateral
agreements. In addition, its member countries could pass a resolution agreeing
to move toward a multilateral solution as their bilateral agreements become
stronger and more numerous. The major advantage of this structure is that each
bilateral agreement can be tailored to the individual authorities and procedures
of each country. In addition, those pairs of countries prepared to enter into a
more comprehensive agreement can avoid the risk of a multilateral agreement
that represents only the lowest common denominator of agreed cooperation.
Conscious progress toward a multilateral agreement, however, would keep coun-
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tries thinking in terms of universal cooperation, which eventually could be the
most efficient and effective solution.
Certain countries will not immediately want to enter any new bilateral
agreements because they calculate that the risks of harming domestic industry
attendant in a cooperative effort will outweigh the benefits of greater enforcement
power. Their calculus will likely change, however, as commerce becomes increas-
ingly international and escapes their regulations.
The majority of bilateral information-sharing agreements to date have been
either Memoranda of Understanding or Agreements and not binding treaties.
Governments are likely to want to follow the same route in the antitrust area
given the sensitive nature of some of the information at stake. However, as in
the case of an MLAT, a binding treaty that has an adequate exception clause
can represent a stronger commitment while still retaining flexibility. Antitrust
authorities should strive for these types of binding commitments. Whether the
parties to the bilateral agreements should be the competition authorities or the
governments themselves depends on the significance of the choice within the
domestic law of the countries involved. The EC-U.S. antitrust agreement and
the Canada-U.S. MLAT and antitrust MOU are between the governments them-
selves. But in the securities area, most of the MOUs are between agencies.
Effective implementation of any bilateral instrument, and eventually a multilat-
eral one, has to consider domestic legal and political conditions. The greatest
challenge will be to change domestic laws to allow countries to operate fully under
a comprehensive cooperation agreement. Countries must amend or supersede
confidentiality laws that prevent the release of information to other countries and
laws that could let foreign information be released. In addition, authorities should
seek laws that allow evidence gathering on behalf of other competition authorities.
The timing and content of efforts like the new law allowing the United States
to enter international cooperation agreements, will depend on political will. In
the end, effectively addressing lawmakers' and lobbyists' fears is the key to
establishing a productive system.2 °2
VII. Conclusion
Antitrust authorities are currently greatly hampered by their inability to cooper-
ate effectively. The current tools available to competition authorities are insuffi-
cient to handle new international illegal conduct. Except for minor exceptions,
current arrangements between countries do not provide for the type of assistance
agencies need: the sharing of confidential information and the gathering of evi-
dence on one another's behalf.
Other areas of enforcement, such as securities regulation, have overcome policy
202. See Metzenbaum, supra note 157 (example of lawmaker fears about harming American
interests).
SPRING 1995
152 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
differences and similar obstacles to meaningful cooperation and have developed
broad cooperative regimes. The antitrust community must likewise address the
growing need for international cooperation. The new U.S. law allowing interna-
tional antitrust cooperation provides an opportunity the Antitrust Division must
seize. The United States and other countries must adopt new bilateral agreements
and modify old ones if they are truly going to be able to continue their effective
regulation in a future of growing international commerce. They must also work
steadily toward a multilateral system that would offer no escape to violating
companies. The alternative is unchecked anticompetitive behavior that could
seriously harm the welfare of the world's consumers.
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